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EEC Antitrust Law: Its Development and
Philosophy with Special Attention to Intellectual
Property Rights
by James D. Myers*
I. Introduction
What follows is concerned with the antitrust law of the European
Common Market or the European Economic Community (hereinafter
referred to as the EEC), its development and philosophy. It is becoming
increasingly important for American businessmen and lawyers to have a
basic knowledge of EEC law not only because the EEC is now the
world's largest trading block, but also because many U.S. multinationals
operate under EEC law in Europe. The purpose of this article is to pro-
vide the American entrepreneur and attorney with a fundamental under-
standing of the sort of commercial activities that may and may not be
legally entered into in the EEC. Accordingly, this discussion will not be
overly legalistic or technical. Instead, it will consider the general back-
ground, development, and organization of the EEC. The underlying
philosophy or spirit of its creation, which continues to pervade its admin-
istration in all areas, will also be examined. If these basic concepts are
recognized and understood, they can provide significant insight into par-
ticular situations that arise, legal gymnastics notwithstanding.
In addition, this article will review the particular provisions of the
Treaty of Rome that form the substantive bases for the ECC's antitrust
law and how these provisions have interfaced in practice with the indus-
trial property rights created by member states' laws.
II. The Organization and Goals of the EEC
The EEC was originally established by a series of treaties among six
nations: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxem-
bourg.1 The first treaty, the Treaty of Paris, 2 created a common market
* Partner, Bell, Seltzer, Park & Gibson, P.A., Charlotte, N.C.; B.S., Ch. E. 1963, J.D.
1972, University of South Carolina.
I Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, entered into force July 25,
1952, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter cited and referred to as Treaty of Paris]; Treaty Establish-
ing the European Atomic Energy Community, entered ito force Jan. 1, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 1969;
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, entered into force Jan. 1, 1958, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited and referred to as Treaty of Rome]. These six original nations
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limited to coal and steel through establishment of the European Coal
and Steel Community. Thereafter, it was the Treaty of Rome 3 that ex-
tended the common market basically full-scope into all general areas of
intra-Community commerce.
The broad goals and purposes of the EEC are set forth in the early
portions of the Treaty of Rome (hereinafter referred to as simply the
"Treaty"):
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member
States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious develop-
ment of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an
increase in stability, an accelerated raising of standards of living and
closer relations between the States belonging to it.
4
These ultimate goals, to achieve collective economic growth and to better
the collective standard of living throughout the EEC, reappear time and
time again, in spirit and substance, both in the specific provisions of the
Treaty and subsequent interpretive regulations and decisions.
To gain further insight into the development of the EEC and its
workings, it is well to reflect on the status of Western Europe at the time
the Treaty was drafted: post-war rebuilding was well on its way and
national hopes for the future were brightening. However, world econom-
ics had drastically changed, and nations that had once held positions of
dominance found themselves faced with the challenge of discovering a
means for economic survival. New large global superpowers foreshad-
owed any real likelihood of individual economic success. The member
nations accordingly acknowledged as a reality that economic growth and
prosperity, or even survival, were apparently possible only through col-
lective efforts toward common goals." The Treaty of Rome was the re-
sult.6
The Treaty sought to accomplish these common goals by eliminat-
ing intra-Community trade barriers, accompanying customs duties,
quantitative trade restrictions, and other particular measures tending to
impede trade.7 Additionally, the Treaty sought to promote "the institu-
tion of a system ensuring the competition in the common market is not
distorted,"8 by including articles which proscribed certain anticompeti-
were later joined by three new member states: Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland. Treaty of
Accession, entered intoforce Jan. 1, 1973,__ U.N.T.S. . Three other nations have applied, and
are currently negotiating, for membership: Greece, see Bull. E.C. 6/75, point 1201; Portugal, see
Bull. E.C. 3/77, point 1.1.1; and Spain, see Bull. E.C. 7/8/77, point 1.1.1.
2 Treaty of Paris, supra note 1.
3 Treaty of Rome, supra note I. For a general treatment of the historical background and
evolution of the Treaty of Rome, see P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY LAW (2d ed. 1975).
4 Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 2.
5 See generally K. SAVAGE, THE STORY OF THE COMMON MARKET (1970).
6 Though the EEC system is the creature of a treaty, it operates within member states,
and is therefore international law working internally in individual member states.
7 Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 3(a).
8 Id art. 3(o.
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tive practices.
To effectuate the goals of the Community, the Treaty also provided
for four bodies: an Assembly, a Council, a Commission, and a Court of
Justice, 9 each of which would serve a separate and important function.
The Assembly,' 0 or the European Parliament as it is often called, is
a formal body made up of delegations from the legislative bodies of the
member states. It convenes in Strasbourg where it conducts inquiries
and considers questions of policy. The Assembly has no real lawmaking
power, however. The Council of Ministers"I usually sits in Brussels, and
it consists of representatives from the cabinets of the member states. The
Council exercises the basic legislative powers 12 of the Community and
issues regulations and guidelines for the application of the Treaty. How-
ever, the Commission drafts proposed regulations and opinions and for-
wards them to the Council. 13 The Assembly and the Council are in
effect secondary bodies insofar as the visible administration of the EEC
and its laws are concerned.
The next body, the Commission,' 4 headquartered in Brussels, is rel-
atively small (thirteen members with at least one representative for each
member state),' 5 yet it has the substantial job of actually administering
the law of the Treaty. Specifically, the Commission is empowered by the
Treaty to ensure that the Treaty's provisions are properly applied, to
formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters relating to
the Treaty, to have its own power of decision in initial stages of Treaty
law proceedings, and to exercise particular powers conferred on it by the
Council, such as issuing regulations in pertinent areas.' 6 Qualitatively,
the Commission does have a relatively strong administrative and investi-
gative staff, although it is admittedly small in number compared to its
large area of responsibility. Included in this staff is a "Competition Di-
rectorate" which is particularly concerned with the application of the
antitrust provisions. The normal procedure for the passage of legislation
begins with a proposal initiated by the Commission.17 This is followed
by consultation with the Assembly,' and if approved, adoption by the
Council. 19
The fourth of the administrative bodies is the Court of Justice, or
the European Court of Justice as it is often called, which is headquar-
9 Id. art. 4.
l0 Id art. 138(2). The Assembly has 431 members.
Id. art. 146.
12 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 146 for a description of the breadth of powers
which the Council enjoys.
13' Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, arts. 149, 155.
14 Id. art. 157.
15 Id.
16 Id. art. 155; see also art. 189.
'7 Id arts. 155, 152, 21(2).
18 Id. art. 137.
19 Id. arts. 145, 152.
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tered in Luxembourg. It may sit as a full court of nine judges, or in
panels of three or five.20 Jurisdiction is given under the Treaty to make
preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the Treaty, to rule
on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Com-
munity, to interpret statutes derived from the Treaty, to review Commu-
nity questions and decisions arising from national courts or tribunals of
member states, 2' and to review the decisions of the Commission and the
Council.22
The activities, regulations, and rulings of the Commission and the
Court take on further significance when one considers that the Treaty
specifically sets forth the particular force and effects of the various types
of pronouncements made by these two bodies.23 In particular, article
189 provides:
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in
its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon
each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the na-
tional authorities the choice of form and methods.
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is
addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
24
III. An Overview of the Treaty's "Antitrust" Provisions
Articles 85 and 86 are the basic "antitrust" provisions of the Treaty
which deal with restrictive business practices. Their full text appears in
the footnote below. 25 The framework of the articles as well as their de-
20 Id art. 165.
21 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, arts. 169, 170, 171.
22 Id art. 173.
23 Id. art. 189.
24 Id.
25 Id arts. 85, 86. Art. 85 provides:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agree-
ments between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particu-
lar those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading con-
ditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to com-
mercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically
void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
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tailed language should be examined carefully, particularly article 85.
Article 85 nominally prohibits agreements, decisions and concerted
practices which accomplish various restrictive results. Such agreements,
decisions or practices must also have as their object or effect the preven-
tion, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Mar-
ket. 26 While such prohibited agreements, decisions or practices shall be
"automatically void," the provisions of the article just outlined may be
declared inapplicable if certain conditions are met. 2 7 These conditions
are set out in article 85(3) and include the improvement of the produc-
tion or distribution of goods, or promotion of technical or economic pro-
gress. In addition, these benefits must be shared with consumers. Article
85 thus prohibits, but it also excuses.
Whereas article 85 addresses matters of specific conduct of busi-
nesses while in the Community, article 86 speaks more to structure. In its
most fundamental terms, article 86 prohibits abuses by those with domi-
nant positions in the market.28 More specifically, article 86 proscribes
the following actions by those enjoying considerable market power:
(1) the imposition of inequitable terms on a trading
partner 29
(2) the limitation of output to the detriment of consum-
ers
3 0
(3) price discrimination 3 ' and
(4) the use of tying clauses.3 2
It should be borne in mind, however, that the list offered by the article is
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting techni-
cal or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and
which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensa-
ble to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in re-
spect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Art. 86 provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so
far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other un-
fair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other par-
ties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
26 Id art. 85.
27 Id art. 85(3).
28 Id art. 86.
29 Id. art. 86(a).
30 Id art. 86(b).
31 Id art. 86(c).
32 Id art. 86(d).
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exemplary and is by no means exhaustive. Moreover, recent cases have
indicated that less malevolent conduct than that described, conducted by
firms in a dominant market position, may lead to article 86 difficulties. 33
Aside from the problem of ascertaining what type of conduct might
run afoul of article 86, the practitioner is also faced with the challenge of
determining what is "dominant market position." The article does not
offer a definition of this vital term. However, recent case law suggests
that a position of "dominance" may have been reached by one enjoying
as little as forty percent of the market.
34
Because it sets forth implementation procedures for articles 85 and
86, Regulation 17 should be read as a complement to the basic antitrust
articles of the Rome Treaty. It requires notification of new35 and ex-
isting 36 agreements, decisions, and practices. 37 The purpose of the regu-
lation is to "ensure effective supervision " 38 of the Community's antitrust
laws as well as to give undertakings an opportunity to know whether they
are in violation of article 85(1) or article 86. 39 The EEC system is basi-
cally an "illegal until authorized" system. 40  In other words, until an
agreement or practice has been notified, it is considered invalid.
4 1
There are three procedures by which the Commission may deliver
decisions. The first is negative clearance, 42 a process whereby firms ap-
ply to the Commission hoping that it will find article 85(1) inapplicable.
The Commission may also render an infringement decision. In this case,
the Commission takes the initiative, and finds an infringement under ar-
ticle 85 or 86. It then "require[s] the undertakings or associations of un-
33 Re Continental Can Co., Decision of the Commission, Dec. 9, 1971, J.O. COMM. EUR.
(No. L7) 25(1972), It Comm. Mkt. L.R. DII (1972); see also Europemballage Corp. and Conti-
nental Can Co. v. Commission des Communaut~s europeennes, [1973] CJ. Comm. E. Rec, 215,
11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973).
34 United Brands Co. v. Commission of the European Communities, Decision of the
Court, Feb. 14, 1978, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429 (1978), [1977-78 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8429.
:35 Reg. 17, art. 4; J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L13) 204 (1962) [hereinafter Reg. 17].
36 Id art. 5. See Robert Bosch and Another v. Kleding-Verkoopbedrijf De Geus en
Vitdenbogerd, Decision of the Court, April 6, 1962, 119621 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 91, I Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 1 (1962), 11961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8003.
37 For a discussion of what constitutes an agreement or practice, see Re Cartel in Quinine,
Decision of the Commission, July 16, 1969, J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L192) 5 (1969), 8 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. D41 (1969); Re Cartel in Aniline Dyes, Decision of the Commission, July 24, 1969,
J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L195) 11 (1969), 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D23 (1969); Imperial Chemical
Industries, Ltd. v. Commission des Communautfs europeennes, 11972] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 619,
11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557 (1972).
38 Reg. 17, preamble.
39 Id.
40 Such a practice is alien to the American jurisprudential requirement of actual contro-
versy, but it is characteristic of the Community's pragmatism.
41 See Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin (No. 2), [1973] CJ. Comm. E. Rec. 77, 12 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 287, 293 (1973). See also Brauerai A. Bilger Sohne GmbH v. Jehle and Another,
Decision of the Court, Mar. 18, 1970, 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 382 (1974:1), [1967-1970 Transfer
Binder] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8076.
42 Reg. 17, art. 2.
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dertakings concerned to bring such an infringement to an end."' 43 The
third possibility is an exemption decision. After a party has submitted its
agreement for notification, the Commission may grant an exemption
pursuant to article 85(3). 4 4 In practice, most businesses apply concur-
rently for negative clearance under article 85(1) and for an exemption
under article 85(3). Article 8 of Regulation 17 expressly limits the time
span of any exemption issued, however. Thus, even if one receives an
article 85(3) exemption, it "shall be issued for a specified period and con-
ditions and obligations may be attached thereto. '45 Any exemption is-
sued is renewable under Regulation 17, article 8(2).46
If one does not receive negative clearance for an exemption, review
of the Commission's decision may be made by the Court of Justice.4 7
This provision is especially important when a fine has been assessed
under article 15 of Regulation 17. Fines may amount to one million
units of account, or more; however, they "shall not be imposed in respect
of acts taking place: (a) after notification to the Commission and before
its decision in application of article 85(3) .... ,,48 Therefore, notifica-
tion is encouraged by reducing the potential fine which may be assessed
against an undertaking. If a company has already paid a fine, some "set-
off" may be allowed. However, the amount of "set-off" allowed is depen-
dent on whether the sanction was imposed by a member or non-member
state.
49
Among other pronouncements of the Commission relevant to anti-
trust matters are Regulation 19 and the so-called "Christmas Message of
1962." Regulation 19 of 196550 empowers the Commission to issue regu-
lations authorizing block exemptions applicable to certain categories of
activities. 5' Activities covered by such a regulation may be conclusively
considered exempted under article 85(3), without the necessity of indi-
vidual submissions. These block exemptions "shall be made for a speci-
fied period. . . . [Any exemption] may be repealed or amended where
circumstances have changed with respect to any factor which was basic
to its being made."'52 Pursuant to Regulation 19 of 1965, the Commis-
sion issued Regulation 67 in 1967.53 Regulation 67 is an example of a
block exemption which applies to certain categories of bilateral exclu-
sive-dealing agreements. Among other things, that Regulation listed cer-
43 Id. art. 3.
44 Id. art. 9(l). See Re Cartel in Quinine, supra note 37.
4-5 Reg. 17, art. 8(I).
46 Article 8(2) of Regulation 17 provides that "[a] decision may on application be renewed
if the requirements of Article 85(3) of the Treaty continue to be satisfied."
47 Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 173; Reg. 17, art. 17.
48 Reg. 17, art. 15(5).
49 Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission des Communaut~s europeennes, [1972]
C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1281, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 864 (1973).
50 Regulation 19/65, 36 O.J. EUR. COMM. 533 (1965).
51 Id art. 1.
52 Id art. 2.
53 Regulation 67/67, 57 O.J. EUR. COMM. 849 (1967).
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tain restrictive clauses common to exclusive-dealing arrangements,
which were accorded exemption from article 85(1) for about a five year
period.
On December 24, 1962, the Commission issued a nonbinding An-
nouncement known as "The Christmas Message" on patent license
agreements 54 giving some indication of the considerations by which it
would be guided in interpreting the prohibition of article 85(1) with re-
gard to clauses often found in certain patent license contracts. 55 The
effect of the Announcement was that as long as contracts did not contain
restrictions other than those resulting from the enumerated clauses, the
Commission would not consider them as falling within the prohibition of
article 85(1).56 Thus, the incentive for seeking negative clearance would
be removed in these instances. In addition, the need for a Commission
determination of legal position in individual cases would be rendered
unnecessary. 57 "The Christmas Message" was initially given considera-
ble weight in commercial thinking as an authoritative statement of per-
missible conduct in the Community. Subsequently, it became apparent
through a series of decisions that the Commission and the Court of Jus-
tice themselves were no longer following the announced guidelines in all
respects.58 The decisions reveal that the Commission is of the opinion
that a territorial limitation, by whatever means, of the licensee's selling
rights falls within the prohibition of article 85(1), provided its effects are
noticeable. However, such a limitation of manufacturing rights would,
in principle, escape the prohibition.59 Not surprisingly, the Commission
has recently indicated that it will soon replace "The Christmas Message"
guidelines. 6
0
Finally, article 30 6 1 of the Treaty has recently achieved substantive
54 J.O. COMM. EUR. 2922 (1962).
55Id. § I.
56 Id § III. See generaly Note, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 957, 990-93 (1977).
57 However, this is not tantamount to a "block exemption." J.O. COMM. EUR., supra note
54, at § III.
58 Re the Agreements of Burroughs AG and Etablissements L. Delplanque et Fils, Com-
mission Decision of Jan. 1, 1972, [1972] J.o. CoMM. EUR. (No. L13) 50, I1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
D67 (1972), [1970-72 New Developments] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9485; Re the Contract
of Burroughs AG and Geha-Werke GmbH, Commission Decision of Jan. 17, 1972, J.O. COMM.
EUR. (No. L13) 53 (1972), I1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D72 (1972), [1970-72 New Developments]
CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9486; Re the Agreements of the Davidson Rubber Co., Commis-
sion Decision of June 23, 1972, J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L143) 31 (1972), 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
D52 (1972), [1970-72 New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9512; Re the Agree-
ment of A. Raymond & Co., Commission Decision of June 23, 1972, J.O. COMM. EUR. (No.
L143) 39 (1972), II Comm. Mkt. L.R. D45 (1972), [1970-72 New Developments] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 9513.
59 This latter principle may not apply in more complex situations upon which the Com-
mission had previously reserved itsjudgment: patent pools, cross-licensing and multiple parallel
licenses. J.O. COMM. EUR., supra note 54, at § II. See,, e.g., Re the Agreements of Henkel & Cie
GmbH and Colgate-Palmolive Co., Commission Decision of Jan. 1, 1972, J.O. COMM. EUR.
(No. L14) 14 (1972), [1970-72 New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9491.
60 Draft Regulation of the Commission, Mar. 20, 1979, 24 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 478 (1979).
The new regulation will take effect Jan. 1, 1980. Id at 489.
61 "Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall,
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importance and has been applied by the Court of Justice on several occa-
sions6 2 to condemn practices seemingly allowed under members' national
laws to protect national industrial property rights. A detailed discussion
of this area appears below.
IV. American and EEC Antitrust Law Compared
Since this discussion is aimed primarily at American lawyers with a
general awareness of U.S. antitrust law, it is useful at this point to com-
pare and contrast the major thrust of U.S. antitrust law with that of the
EEC. While there are some similarities between the U.S. and EEC com-
petition law both in form and philosophy, the reader should be aware
that there are also some substantial variations. This is especially true
with respect to goals and practices under the two systems. As a result,
one may anticipate differences in attitude and outcome. A brief compar-
ison of the U.S. and EEC antitrust systems, their heritages and workings
is in order.
A. The Histories, General Goals and Workings of the Two Sstems
The Sherman Act 6 3 and the American antitrust laws evolved in the
late nineteenth century in the era of large combinations of companies or
trusts in the railroad and oil industries. Growth had reached the point
that a very few trusts virtually controlled these basic industries; entry by
new firms and effective competition were nearly impossible. There was a
genuine concern that a few powerful trusts would soon control the econ-
omy, if they did not already. The Sherman Act, enacted in this environ-
ment, was used as the primary tool to break up these trusts.64
Thereafter, the government established enforcement policies utilizing the
Act which were aimed at preserving a competitive marketplace. Thus, it
is clear that among the main goals of American antitrust are the preser-
vation of ease of entry by new firms into any field or industry and the
assurance that competition will always be present, along with its attend-
ant benefits.
Congress drafted sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act in very gen-
eral language,6 5 in order that they might apply to a wide range of activi-
ties having anticompetitive effects. Indeed, these provisions have been
without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited between Member States." Treaty
of Rome, supra note 1, art. 30.
62 See Van Zuylen Freres & Adriaan de Peijper v. Hag A.G., Decision of the Court, July 3,
1974, 119741 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 731, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 127 (1974); Centrafarm B.V. v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., Decision of the Court, Oct. 31, 1974, 119741 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1147, 14
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 480 (1974); Centrafarm B.V. v. Winthrop B.V., Decision of the Court, Oct.
31, 1974, [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1183, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 480 (1974).
63 Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). See generally Lacey,
Antitrust and Foreign Commerce. Reach and Grasp, 5 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1 (1980).
64 See, e.g., Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911).
65 Sherman Act, supra note 63.
46 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
applied over the years to many different types of activities. Thus a sub-
stantial body of detailed antitrust case law has developed.
In the course of interpreting and applying the American antitrust
laws, the U.S. courts have supplemented these vaguely worded statutes.
Not the least important product of these judicial actions is the well
known "rule of reason."'66 Under this concept a particular activity, al-
though it might appear to run afoul of the literal provisions of the anti-
trust laws, may still be adjudged proper, if the activity does not produce
a substantial anticompetitive result and is no more restrictive than rea-
sonably necessary.
67
Despite the appeal of a very broad application of the "rule of rea-
son," the courts soon recognized that some classes of behavior should be
summarily condemned. These practices, such as price fixing, had such
inherently pernicious effects that, even assessed for all results and influ-
ences, they would be held improper under any application of the "rule of
reason." For these classes of activities, a procedural shortcut, the per se
rule of illegality, dispensed with otherwise detailed and unnecessary anal-
yses under the "rule of reason."
'68
On their face, articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome would ap-
pear to directly parallel sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. However,
when the history and purpose of the EEC system are closely analysed, the
apparent identity loses much of its significance.
As may be recalled, a principal goal of the EEC was to integrate the
separate economies of the member states into a strong central market
system. Accordingly, any activity that serves to thwart this basic goal to
any appreciable degree is almost without exception deemed undesirable
and illegal. This has also been the feeling with respect to activities that
tend to restrain the free flow of commodities between and among mem-
ber states.6 9 On the other hand, if the challenged activities have en-
hanced intra-member trade and fortunes, the activities have typically not
been the subject of prosecution. This result pertains regardless of the
existence of other apparently noncompetitive effects that would not be
allowed under American antitrust law. The EEC approach has been
more concerned with reaching an overall beneficial economic outcome
than with isolated instances of temporarily reduced competition.
Another principal goal of the EEC is the protection of competition
within the Community to allow internal competition to serve as an impe-
tus for commercial growth among membqr nations. In general, this goal
is one shared with the U.S. system. However, in the EEC the goal has
been more actively pursued by EEC bodies. For example, in the interest
of promoting competition, the EEC Commission has encouraged various
66 221 U.S. 1.
67 See 221 U.S. at 65.
68 See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
69 See the later discussion of particular cases herein for specific examples.
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forms of technology exchanges among small and medium-sized busi-
nesses and sanctioned otherwise questionable mergers to allow fledgling
businesses to thrive and thereafter become competitive in the Commu-
nity (and internationally). 70
With respect to the substance of antitrust provisions, EEC antitrust
law obviously provides more specific guidance than does its American
counterpart. In the EEC the practitioner may draw on Treaty provi-
sions, specific regulations and opinions of the Council and the Commis-
sion, and related procedural devices through which advisory opinions
may be obtained. Such specificity is predictable considering the civil law
heritage of many members of the Community and the active nature of its
members' national courts. Furthermore, the prevailing Community
trend for practical approaches to reach desired results without a compul-
sion to maintain symmetry of legal theory has had an influence.
B. Article 85 of the Treaty Compared with Section I of the Sherman Act
Like section 1 of the Sherman Act, article 85(1) of the Treaty is
literally concerned with prohibiting agreements or combinations that
have a substantially adverse effect on competition. Furthermore, as in
the case of the Sherman Act, nuances in application and interpretation
of the language of article 85 have had a substantial effect on its real
thrust and effect.
For example, the EEC Commission and Court have taken the gen-
eral language in article 85(1), referring to the effect on trade between
members states and restriction of competition within the Common Mar-
ket, and used it to selectively excuse activities that might otherwise seem
improper.7 ' Article 85 is concerned with intra-Community commerce
and not with extra-Community activities, except those that do have ulti-
mate anticompetitive effects within the Community. The basic thrust of
the article is thus to prohibit restrictive practices "which may effect trade
between Member states."' 72 (Emphasis added). In comparison, at least in
some cases, the American antitrust laws affirmatively seek to exercise ju-
risdiction over "foreign commerce."'73
As in the Sherman Act, the provisions of article 85(1) ostensibly pro-
hibit all restrictive agreements. Yet, under article 85(3) the Commission
is given the power to grant exemptions. This provision has been likened
to the United States' "rule of reason" approach. However, it is more like
a "second chance" by which the accused party (or the party seeking ex-
emption) may yet escape prohibition of'its activities under article 85(1)
even after there has already been a determination that its activities do
70 See Rahl, European Common Market Antitrust Laws, 40 ANTITRUST L.J. 814-15 (197 1).
71 See Wolf & Montauk, Antitrust in the European Economic Communit: An Analysir of Recent
Developments in the Court ofjustice, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 349, 364 (1978).
72 Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 85.
73 See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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unduly diminish competition. This first level of applicability as to affect-
ing and diminishing Community competition probably more closely ap-
proximates our "rule of reason."
C Article 86 of the Treaty Compared with Secttwn 2 of the Sherman Act
Article 86 of the Treaty is generally comparable to section 2 of the
Sherman Act, yet article 86 does not prohibit the actual existence of mo-
nopoly power; instead it prohibits "abuse of a dominant position
74
where "it may affect trade between Member States."' 75 There is no clear
guidance in article 86 as to how closely "dominant position" approxi-
mates a classic monopoly position, yet in one of its decisions the Commis-
sion has given general directions as to what constitutes a "dominant
position":
Undertakings are in a dominant position when they have the power to
behave independently, which puts them in a position to act without tak-
ing into account their competitors, purchasers or suppliers. That is the
position when, because of their share of the market, or of their share of
the market combined with the availability of technical knowledge, raw
materials or capital, they have the power to determine prices or to con-
trol production or distribution for a significant part of the products in
question. This power does not necessarily have to derive from an abso-
lute domination permitting the undertakings which hold it to eliminate
the decisionmaking power of their partners. It is sufficient that they be
strong enough as a whole to ensure to those undertakings an overall in-
dependence of behavior, even if there are differences in intensity in their
influences on the different partial markets.
7 6
Regarding the question of what constitutes "abuse" of a dominant mar-
ket position, the text of article 86 offers an illustrative list of prohibited
practices.
77
Note that article 86 does not have an exemption provision as does
article '85. However, the Commission does from time to time issue appli-
cable Notices that relate to particular acts that at least at the time of
issuance are deemed not to come within the Treaty prohibitions and the
Commission may also grant selective negative clearances.
V. The Status of Nationally Exclusive Intellectual Property Rights
in the EEC
In America predictable conflict arises between the antitrust laws
and exclusive rights granted under other federal laws regarding the ex-
ploitation of industrial or intellectual properties. United States' law rec-
ognizes various exclusive rights in the areas of patents, trademarks and
copyrights that may initially appear to lessen competition and generally
74 Treaty of Rome, supra note I, art. 86.
75 Id
76 Re Continental Can Co., Decision of the Commission, Dec. 9, 1971, J.O. COMM. EUR.
(No. L7) 25 (1972), 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. DIi (1972).
77 Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 86.
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conflict with the avowed purpose of the antitrust laws.78 Accordingly, in
the United States there exists a fairly delicate balance as to how far ex-
clusivity and dominance may be exercised with respect to intellectual
property rights. One must remember that these rights arise from grants
under the same national system of laws as do our antitrust laws.
In the EEC the conflict is even more complex. The Community
must try to resolve the tensions between the exclusive property rights
granted under the national laws of the Member States and the antitrust
provisions of the Treaty, binding the entire Community. In particular,
the EEC must ensure that exclusive intellectual property rights may be
exercised within the Community as granted under Member States' law,
and yet see to it that the Community's ultimate goals of commercial
unity and the abolition of intra-Community trade restrictions are pro-
moted.
The Treaty does not offer much help in resolving the conflict. Arti-
cle 36 of the Treaty superficially seems to sanction the possibility of trade
prohibitions or restrictions where "the protection of industrial and com-
mercial property"7 9 is involved. Article 36 also states: "Such prohibi-
tions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary
discrimination as a disguised restriction on trade between Member
States."8 0 Article 222 of the Treaty adds the further thought: "The
Treaty shall in no way prejudice the system existing in Member States in
respect of property." 8' It might therefore appear from the language of
the Treaty that all industrial or intellectual property rights created in
Member States would be left intact and readily enforceable, even to the
point of barring intra-Community commerce, so long as such enforce-
ment would not amount to "artificial discrimination" or "disguised re-
striction."
Such is not the actual outcome, however, because once again the
Treaty's goal of unity is the final determinant. Indeed, article 5 of the
Treaty states that Member States "shall abstain from any measure which
could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty. '8 2 The
following discussion of the significant cases before the EEC Court of Jus-
tice in this area illustrates the interplay of property rights with antitrust
in the Community.
Two of the first EEC cases regarding intellectual property rights
were Consten & Grundig- Verkaufs-GmbH v. EEC Commission8 3 and Parke, Da-
78 This is hardly to say that the exercise of American intellectual property rights in con-
nection with related agreements, management and ownership is exempted from antitrust scru-
tiny.
79 Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 36.
80 Id.
81 Id art. 222.
82 Id art. 5.
83 Decision of the Court, July 13, 1966, [1966] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 429, 5 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 418 (1966).
50 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
vis & Co. v. Probel.8 4 In the Grundig case, Grundig of Germany had
granted to Consten, as its licensee, certain exclusive rights in France.
These rights included the permission to register and maintain the
Grundig trademark, GINT, in France. Thereafter, a third party bought
authorized Grundig equipment in Germany and sought to market it
under the CINT mark in France at a lower price. Consten then sought to
block such importation and marketing by asserting infringement of the
French GINT trademark.
In its analysis of the situation, the European Court found the dis-
tributorship and license arrangement to constitute an "agreement" sub-
ject to scrutiny under article 85(1) of the Treaty-regardless of its
vertical nature and of the fact that the arrangement included provisions
relating to national industrial property rights. The Court concluded that
the prohibitions of article 85(1) in effect preempted national intellectual
property rights, or at least the exercise of such rights, when the effect of
the exercise through an agreement was to prevent, restrict or distort com-
petition within the Common Market."5
A similar situation was involved in the Parke, Davis case, but with a
different outcome. Here, Parke, Davis held a Dutch patent covering a
drug product and sought to enjoin the drug's importation into the
Netherlands from Italy, where the drug could not be patented. The
Court again reasoned that while the language of the Treaty did not pre-
clude the existence of national industrial property rights, the exercise of
such rights could amount to activity prohibited by articles 85 or 86 of the
Treaty.8 6 The Court then made a technical examination of the situation
and found no violation since it could neither find an "agreement" to
bring into play an application of article 85(1) nor any abusive exploita-
tion of a dominant postion to bring article 86 into play.
These two early decisions seemed to indicate that in most cases na-
tional industrial rights would be honored by the European Court, and
that concern was warranted only where licenses of intellectual property
were involved. Subsequent cases proved this to be an oversimplification.
One of the next significant cases in this area was Srena Sr./. v. Eda
Sr. 1.87 In Si'rena, long before the existence of the Rome Treaty and the
creation of the Common Market, an American company had registered
the mark, PREP, in Italy and thereafter transferred its registration to
Sirena of Italy. The same American company permitted a German en-
tity to use the PREP mark in Germany. The controversy arose later
84 Decision of the Court, Feb. 29, 1968, [1968] CJ. Comm. E. Rec. 81, 7 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 47 (1968).
85 Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. EEC Commission, supra note 83. What is inter-
esting to note is that Grundig eventually bought out Consten completely and there was thereaf-
ter no problem under art. 85.
86 7 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 47.
87 Decision of the Court, Feb. 18, 1971, [1971] CJ. Comm. E. Rec. 69, 10 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 260 (1971).
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when the German entity began to sell the trademarked product in Italy
at a much lower price.
Although the Court did not find any dominant position involved
that could trigger application of article 86, the Court did go back and
find the twenty-year-old transfer of the trademark and the Italian regis-
tration to be an agreement to be scrutinized under article 85(1).18 The
Court came to this conclusion despite the fact that the agreement was
entered into long before the effective date of the Treaty. The Court ex-
plained that it found the effects of the agreement still extant.8 9 So char-
acterized, the Court concluded that the arrangement did have the effect
of reestablishing trade separation and distortion of competition and de-
nied any ban on importation into Italy.90
Decided soon after Sirena was Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v. Metro SB
Grossmarkte GmbH & Co. KG.9' Deutsche Grammophon (hereinafter referred
to as DG) manufactured phonographic records in Germany and held the
German equivalent of a copyright on the records. DG records were sold
in France through a DG-authorized and wholly-owned French subsidi-
ary. A third party, Metro, thereafter acquired DG records indirectly
from the French subsidiary and sought to market them in Germany at a
lower price than was charged by DG. DG sought to block this with an
injunction authorized by German law.92
In considering this situation, the European Court first ruled that
while article 36 of the Treaty did indeed acknowledge the existence of
national rights, such rights could be used to restrict intra-Market imports
and exports only to the extent that they were justified to protect the "spe-
cific object" of the particular intellectual property. 93 The Court did not
find this arrangement one designed to protect the "specific object" of
such rights, although the Court did not expound on what such "specific
objects" would be.94 Furthermore, the Court laid the foundation for an
"exhaustion" doctrine based on the premise that the first authorized en-
try in the market of a product protected under some industrial property
right exhausted that right for all countries and prevented the property-
right owner from thereafter imposing territorial restrictions based on
such right. 95 The Court then found an article 85(1) subject agreement in
the parent/subsidiary situation, and struck down the arrangement be-'
tween them without finding dominance under article 86.96
The next prominent case involving the status of national intellectual
88 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 272.
89 Id
90 Id. at 273.
91 Decision of the Court, June 8, 1971, [1971] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 487, 10 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 631 (1971).
92 DG, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 634.
93 Id. at 657.
94 Id
95 Id
96 Id. at 659.
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property rights in light of Community antitrust law was Van Zuylen Freres
v. HAG, A.G 97 A German company, HAG, A.G., at one time owned a
Belgian subsidiary to which it had transferred a Belgian trademark regis-
tration for the mark HAG prior to World War II. Afterwards, in connec-
tion with reparation-related procedures, the HAG Belgian subsidiary
became a separate, unrelated company and commenced marketing coffee
under the HAG mark in Belgium and Luxembourg. HAG, A.G. thereaf-
ter began to export its coffee into Belgium and Luxembourg under the
same mark. An action for trademark infringement was brought by the
HAG Belgian company's distributor to halt such importation.
The Court's resolution of the issues was less than compelling. The
Court acknowledged that since there was no agreement present as in
Deutsch Grammophon, article 85(1) technically did not apply.98 Nonethe-
less, the Court considered the situation as one in which the "specific ob-
ject" of the property rights involved was not the primary concern of the
protection sought. Instead, it found that the concern involved and the
effect sought amounted to simple market restriction, an outcome forbid-
den by the Treaty.99 As further explanation, the Court developed a
"common origin" doctrine, to the effect that where the disparate parties
had previously acquired their interests in the subject matter through
common lineage, subsequent competing sales could not be banned
through the exercise of national industrial property rights. ' 00 This doc-
trine also carried with it certain overtones of the previous "exhaustion"
doctrine. The HAG decision has been widely criticized as directly con-
trary to a trademark's "specific object" of correctly informing the public
as to the true sources of goods.
Next came the pair of Centrafarm cases. 10 1 In the patent-related ac-
tion,10 2 Sterling Drug had sought to enforce certain national patents re-
lating to pharmaceuticals against Centrafarm, which had purchased
authorized drugs in one country and sought to resell them in another.
The Court, left with no other technical procedural violations available,
found article 30 with its general abolition of measures restricting imports
applicable.l0 3 In addition, the Court found the activity was not excused
by article 36 just because of the national industrial property rights in-
97 Decision of the Court, July 3, 1974, [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 731, 14 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 127 (1974).
98 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 143.
99 Id at 144.
100 d
101 Centrafarm B.V. and Adriaan de Peijper v. Sterling Drug, Inc., Decision of the Court,
Oct. 31, 1974, [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1147, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 480 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Centrafarm I]; Centrafarm B.V. and Adriaan de Peijper v. Winthrop B.V., Decision of
the Court, Oct. 31, 1974, [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1183, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 480 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Centrafarm II].
102 Centrafarm I, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 480.
103 Id at 503.
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volved. In particular, the Court reasoned that the activity under scru-
tiny was not directed to the "specific object" of the property right.
The Court went on to define the proper "specific object" for patents
as ensuring the owner's exclusive right to manufacture and znibally circu-
late his product, either directly or through licensed third parties. The
Court did not, however, see such "object" as precluding the importation
of products previously manufactured by the owner or introduced with its
consent elsewhere. 10 4 Not finding such specific object served here, the
Court declined to uphold the existence of any infringement.10 5
In its discussion of the issues raised in the Centrafarm patent case, the
Court indicated that intra-Market imports could be restricted because of
infringement with national patents only when: (a) the product
originated from a nation in which it could not be patented and where it
had been manufactured without the consent of the patentee (as in Parke,
Davis); or (b) where the product was covered by national patents in both
concerned nations and such patents were originally and presently owned
by truly separate and independent owners. 0 6
The second Centrafarm case' 0 7 was related to the trademark aspects
of the patent action previously outlined. With respect to trademarks the
Court employed a "specific object" theory similar to the one applied in
the patent context. The Court defined a proper "specific object" of a
trademark right as ensuring the owner of the trademark of the exclusive
right to use the mark for a first marketing of the product and protecting
it against competition that could abuse its goodwill and trade reputa-
tion. 08 However, the Court found that protection of products under the
trademark in subsequent introduction elsewhere was not a proper "spe-
cific object."' 1 9 Accordingly, no relief was granted on the trademark in-
fringement claim. Unlike the Centrafarm patent-related case, the Court
declined to give any positive guidelines as to how national trademark
rights could be utilized to limit imports.
The next important case regarding intellectual property rights was
EMI Records Ltd v. CBS (Uni'ted Kingdom) Ltd 110 The trademark in-
volved, COLUMBIA, had arisen from a common American source that
had long previously registered it worldwide and thereafter made various
transfers of registrations and uses in different countries. As it turned out,
E.M.I. held all registrations and rights in the EEC countries, while CBS
(U.S.) held U.S. and other extra-EEC rights. E.M.I. sought to enjoin
CBS's German subsidiary from importing and marketing records in Ger-
104 Id
105 Id at 504.
106 Id. at 503-04.
107 Centrafarm II, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 408.
108 Id at 509.
109 Id at 509-10.
110 Decision of the Court, June 15, 1976, 18 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 235 (1976), [1976 Transfer
Binder, Court Decisions] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8350.
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many which bore the mark originating from extra-EEC sources. Here
the Court was not affected by any "common origin" factually present
and granted the relief sought, finding that there was no article 30 danger
present adversely affecting intra-Market free flow of goods and that there
was no intra-Market interest adversely affected by the extra-Market
goods being enjoined from import.III
Some authorities view the E.M.I. case as severely limiting Sirena and
the common origin doctrine. Nonetheless, it is submitted that the pri-
mary concern of the Court in E.M.I. was the welfare of the Community's
interests, which indeed it is charged with by the Treaty.
Another trademark-related action, Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd v. Terra-
nova Indusrze CA. Kapferer & Co. , 12 followed. The parties were admit-
tedly unrelated. Terranova of Germany owned registrations for Terra
marks for component building products, while Terrapin sought to im-
port into Germany prefabricated building structures under the mark Ter-
rapin. Under these circumstances, the Court held that national
trademark rights could be used to preclude such imports in the interest of
avoiding confusion ("specific object"), conditioned on the absences of a
common origin, any real connection between the parties, and any dis-
guised interest of restricting competition.' 13
These cases are generally considered to be the most significant deci-
sions of the EEC Court involving the continued effects of national indus-
trial or intellectual property rights. There are also a number of other
significant opinions of the Commission and the Court involving the pro-
priety of specific provisions contained in licenses of such property rights
which the reader would be advised not to overlook."l 4
Obviously, much of the above controversy between national indus-
trial property rights and the antitrust provisions of the Treaty would be
avoided if there were single forms of intellectual property rights for the
entire EEC. While these have not yet been substantively accomplished,
a form of International Trademark Registration is available which, with
its inclusion of some EEC countries, does go far toward procedurally con-
solidating trademark registration interests. Also, a Community-wide
trademark registration system is being formulated.' 1 5 In addition, there
has been some discussion of a Common Market patent to be incorpo-
rated into the various international and European patent systems and
conventions now in force. However, there are several provisions in the
111 18 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 265.
112 Decision of the Court, June 22, 1976, 18 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 482 (1976), [1976 Transfer
Binder, Court Decisions] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8362.
113 18 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 505-06.
114 See generally Koch, EEC Commission Poiy on Licensing Agreements, ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS
OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 215 (B. Hawk
ed. 1974), for a discussion of some of these cases.
115 See McKie, Patent Cooperation Treaty." A New Adventure in the Internationahty of Patents, 4
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 249 (1979).
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proposed system that may present further conflict. 116
VI. Conclusion
Anyone attempting to forecast whether a particular business prac-
tice runs afoul of the Treaty's anticompetitive provisions would do well
to first consider whether the practice will likely lessen or adversely affect
intra-Market trade. If it will, then the practice should be considered
highly suspect, even if it otherwise appears to be a proper exercise of
national industrial property rights or an activity legal under U.S. or
other countries' antitrust laws.
The Treaty has an admittedly single interest and object-the better-
ment of the Community countries and their economies. Such interest
and object are expressly to be served by the administrative bodies of the
Community, the Commission and the Court of Justice, even at the ex-
pense of apparent theoretical inconsistencies.
Furthermore, the published pronouncements of these bodies should
be read closely and should not be accorded weight beyond the particular
facts actually considered by the bodies in making their decisions. Fi-
nally, the makeup and philosophies of the bodies change as time passes.
There appears to be less reluctance by the Community's bodies to eschew
precedent than in U.S. courts. What may have been allowed previously
may well be struck down in the future without any particular warning,
especially if such a decision then appears to be in the better interests of
the Community and its member states.
Question and Answer Period
Question: How is a charge of anticompetitive activity initiated in the
European Community?
Mr. Myers: An interested party files a series of forms with the Com-
mission. Almost anyone involved in the industry may bring a charge of
anticompetitive activity; in fact, an individual or corporation may re-
quest a determination of the legality of its own activity.
Question: May a private party competitor bring an action under ar-
ticles 85 or 86 or trigger action by the Commission?
Mr. Myers: The European Community and the Treaty do not pro-
vide for treble damage actions or purely private party actions under the
antitrust provision. However, the private party may institute an investi-
gation by the Commission which may result in a fine or injunction.
Questzon: Is it possible to grant a single licensing company an exclu-
sive patent license covering the entire community where the licensee is
given the exclusive right to resell and sell throughout the market under
patents owned by the licensor in all member states?
116 Id
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Mr. Myers: Probably not. It might have been authorized by the
Commission's Christmas message of 1962; however, neither the Commis-
sion nor the Court has really followed that informal pronouncement.
There is presently pending a proposal which would provide a blanket
exemption concerning a number of provisions that occur typically in pat-
ent, trademark, technology and know how transfers. Although details
have not been ironed out, the proposal seems to allow exclusive licensing
agreements and probably would allow this, if and when it is finally en-
acted.
Question: Does the exhaustion doctrine apply where the licensor's
intent is not to restrict trade with the European Community, but merely
to make his license royalty proportionate to the number of separate pat-
ent or patent trademark rights used in the European Community? In
other words, can the initial royalty be recomputed based on the number
of separate rights used?
Mr. Myers: Certainly, you can have and hold patents in each of the
member states of the Community and so long as you are only concerned
with activities within each member state you can exact royalties for each
patent. Problems arise, however, where a product is introduced in one
member state and then a patent owner seeks to limit the licensee to mar-
keting in that state through the use of multiple patents. The general
philosophy of the Treaty and the Community prohibits this type of ar-
rangement. The exhaustion doctrine surely comes into play under these
circumstances.
Question: Has the increase of overseas European business interests
influenced European Community antitrust?
Mr. Myers: I don't think it has. The Commission and the Court of
Justice have consistently applied the Treaty's antitrust provisions and
the antitrust laws in general.
